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Abstract
The advent of the sixth Android version brought a significant security and privacy advancement to its users.
The platform’s security model has changed dramatically, allowing users to grant or deny access to resources
when requested by applications during run-time. This improvement changed the traditional coarse-grained
permission system and it was anticipated for a long time by privacy-aware users. In this paper, we present a
pilot study that aims to analyze how Android users adapted to the run-time permission model. We gathered
anonymous data from 52 participants, who downloaded an application we developed and answered questions
related to the run-time permission model. Their answers suggest that most of them positively accepted the
new model. We also collected data that describe users’ permission settings for each installed application
on their devices. Our analysis shows that individuals make consistent choices regarding the resources they
allow to various applications to access. In addition, the results of this pilot study showcase that on a second
data collection round (occurred one month after the first phase of our experiments), 50% of the respondents
did not change a single permission on their devices and only 2.26% of installed applications (on average)
presented altered permission settings.
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1. Introduction
When Android Developers released the Develop-
ers Preview of the Marshmallow version (v6.0) dur-
ing summer 2015, a major change at the permis-
sion system was introduced; the sixth version ini-5
tiated the run-time permission model. The previ-
ous versions are listing at instalation time the re-
sources that the application to be installed is going
to utilize. After reviewing the requested permis-
sions (which were presented as groups, e.g. Con-10
tacts) the user can choose to accept or deny the
installation. This binary model (accept-reject) has
been criticized at the past as being ineffective to
provide meaningful information about the way the
application to be installed will affect user’s pri-15
vacy [1, 2]. In addition, it limits users’ ability to
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manage the applications’ accessibility to their pri-
vate data. Therefore, the transition from this model
to a new one, that would allow users to control the
resources that applications were allowed to use (fol-20
lowing the iOS paradigm) was anticipated for a long
time.
The run-time permission model (aka ask-on-first-
use (AOFU) [3]) is based on the principle of least
privilege and assumes that applications will be able25
to function at a basic level, even if the users do
not provide access to resources that might affect
their privacy. Therefore, applications designed to
adhere to this model must request access to sensi-
tive resources during run-time. These actions will30
(in theory) keep users informed about what an ap-
plication is trying to do in the background and will
provide limited contextual information [4].
According to the official documentation for An-
droid Developers1, there are two basic categories of35
1http://bit.ly/2d4AdGH
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permissions; normal and dangerous. The documen-
tation notes that the system automatically grants
access to resources that applications requested via
normal permissions, because access to these re-
sources is considered to be of low risk. On the40
other hand, if an application needs to access users’
private information, or other sensitive data stored
on the device, then the associated permissions with
these actions are considered as dangerous. Hence,
applications designed to function properly under45
the AOFU permission model, need to request user’s
permission during run-time, in order to access sen-
sitive information. Therefore, it lies with the users’
discretion if they will accept or deny access to sensi-
tive resources. Additionally, Android users are able50
to revoke access to resources via the Settings ap-
plication under this model. Currently, there exist
nine groups of dangerous permissions: Calendar,
Camera, Contacts, Location, Microphone, Phone,
Sensors, SMS, Storage.55
Recent research work indicated that permission
requests are vital in terms of conducting resource
usage risk assessment and identifying malicious be-
haviors [5]. Permission requests are also used to
assess the app’s quality and installation risk, based60
on patterns identified in high-reputation applica-
tions in the Android market place [6]. Therefore,
app permissions play a major role in users’ pri-
vacy and security. The fact that the number of
decisions that smartphone users must make (re-65
garding the acceptance of these permissions) can
be unrealistically high [7], urged researchers lately
to propose automated permission recommendation
schemes. Some systems use crowdsourcing meth-
ods [8] and others employ machine learning mod-70
els that incorporate contextual information aiming
to predict users’ privacy decisions [3]. In order
to achieve that, Wijesekera et al. [3] used modi-
fied versions of the Android operating system to
acquire application usage data and the Experience75
Sampling Method (ESM) [9] to collect ground truth
data about users’ privacy preferences. Additionally,
Liu et al. [7] deployed rooted devices which were
modified and enhanced with the Android permis-
sion manager “Apps Ops” [2, 10]. Hence, prior work80
was based on experiments conducted with modified
devices, specifically instrumented to gather privacy
related data.
Knowing that under the coarse-grained permis-
sion model, users are not allowed to intervene with85
the access control system (since applications can
access all resources on a mobile device after the
installation process), we investigate in this paper
how Android users adjusted their privacy prefer-
ences under the fine-grained run-time permission90
model (AOFU). We consider the following ques-
tions in this pilot study. a) Which are the sensi-
tive resources Android users allow more often to be
accessed on their phones? b) Are they strict or se-
lective when applications request access to specific95
sensitive data? c) Do they make consistent choices
when they grant or deny access to these resources?
d) Are these choices time persistent?
To this end, this paper2 presents the results of
a pilot study that assesses users’ adaptation to the100
Android run-time permission model. For the needs
of this study we developed and distributed an appli-
cation at the official Android marketplace (Google
Play) aiming to collect anonymous data related to
the permissions that were granted (or denied) by105
users at that time (‘Permissions snapshot’). We did
not monitor users’ actions for a long time because
we assumed that this choice would discourage many
people to voluntarily download the app and partici-
pate to the study. This is a different approach from110
prior work [3, 4, 7] as we aim to gather permission
information from devices that were actually used
by participants in their daily lives and were not
running a modified version of the operating sys-
tem. Our data collection method is not intrusive115
or pervasive and does not introduce biases related
with asking security and privacy questions (privacy
nudges). Thus, we chose to obtain snapshots of the
permission settings from the participants’ devices.
Our application collected permission data twice (in120
an one-month period) and only when the users were
informed and agreed to provide them, according to
the ethics approval agreement. The aim of our pilot
study is to examine users’ perceptions of the pro-
vided security and privacy, and at the same time,125
to investigate how Android users adapted to the
AOFU permission model. This work studies and
presents security and privacy preferences of An-
droid users of the fine-grained permission model.
The contributions of this paper are the following:130
• We collected data derived from devices that
were running the Android Marshmallow oper-
ating system, hence the permission data came
from a sample of 52 participants who were ac-
2This is an extended version of our work [11] presented
on December 2016 at the 8th IEEE International Workshop
on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS) 2016.
2
tually using these devices for a considerable pe-135
riod of time3.
• We present comparative views of users’ per-
missions settings and other privacy preferences
associated to the use of popular social me-
dia. Moreover, we showcase which sensitive re-140
sources were used from our participants more
frequently.
• We demonstrate that our participants pre-
sented a consistent behavior regarding the re-
sources they allow to be accessed by social me-145
dia and communication applications. Further-
more, this pilot study shows that the granted
permissions to installed applications from the
same participants after a period of one month
were not dramatically altered. This result ver-150
ifies similar findings presented recently [7].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The
next section discusses the methodology we used to
derive data and reconstruct permission settings for
each participant. Section 3 presents the acquired155
results focusing at the beginning on the survey an-
swers; then it analyzes our findings from the col-
lected permission data. In section 4 we discuss lim-
itations of our study, proposing at the same time
directions for future work. We review related work160
in section 5 and conclude this paper in section 6.
2. Methodology
This section presents the methodology we used to
collect and analyze data. Data collection was car-
ried out in two phases using an application we de-165
veloped, which was distributed via the official An-
droid marketplace (Google Play) following the ex-
ample of other recent research works [12]. The ap-
plication, named “Permissions Snapshot”, initially
served as a survey instrument, but it also collected170
anonymous permission data from the devices that
were using it. The participants needed to download
the application on their devices, answer six multi-
ple choice questions about their experience with the
run-time permission model and then send permis-175
sion data to our server. At the second phase (after
a period of one month) the same participants were
asked to send permission data again, as explained
3The anonymized dataset can be found online at the fol-
lowing address: http://dx.doi.org/10.14324/000.ds.1520825
in more details in the following section. Before we
distribute the application on Google Play and pub-180
licize it, we obtained approval to proceed with this
project from the UCL Ethics Committee (Project
ID Number: 8945/001).
2.1. Survey and Questionnaire Design
The application we developed targeted Android185
Marshmallow users (SDK 23+) and could not be
installed on devices that run an older version of
the operating system (OS). This means that the
collected data came from participants who were
already familiar with the sixth Android version190
(Marshmallow). During the data collection period
(June - August 2016), the most modern version of
the OS was the sixth; however, the seventh version
(‘Nougat’) was released as a “Developers Preview”
version.195
Our application did not collect personal informa-
tion apart from the package names of the installed
applications on the device and the requested per-
missions. The participants were informed about
this action after reading the ‘Information Sheet’,200
which was provided at the ‘Description’ section of
the installation page on Google Play. The ‘Infor-
mation Sheet’ was also shown when the application
was launched by the user. “Permissions snapshot”
did not collect application usage data because that205
would entail additional effort from users to turn on
the usage statistics feature on their phones. This
action cannot occur automatically or programmat-
ically on modern Android versions. We chose to
refrain from engaging users in this action, having210
in mind that the participants (volunteers) could be
discouraged by any additional complexity, or even
worse, become sceptical about their involvement
with the study and, therefore, quit before answering
any questions.215
In order to avoid duplicate entries from partic-
ipants (and devices), “Permission Snapshots” re-
quested from the system (during run-time) to get
the ANDROID ID of the device4. This number was
used by our application to compute and return a220
hashed value that could be used from us to main-
tain users’ anonymity and, at the same time, iden-
tify possible duplicate entries during analysis. Be-
fore releasing the data to the public, we replaced
these hexadecimal strings with random numbers to225
further anonymize them.
4The ANDROID ID is a hexadecimal number granted by
the system, which uniquely distinguishes devices.
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Figure 1: Screenshots Showcasing “Permissions Snapshot” Application and System’s Functionality.
Next, we discuss how participants were interact-
ing with our application. At the first phase, when
users launched the application, they had to read
the ‘Information Sheet’ which described the aim of230
the study and the steps that would follow. Partic-
ipants had to tap on a check box to indicate they
gave their consent to share anonymous data and
participate to the study. The users were always in-
formed about the current and the next step of the235
process via short texts provided by the application
(see figure 1a). After users agreed to provide their
consent to share anonymous data, the application
received detailed information about the permissions
that the system granted (or not) for each installed240
application at that specific time. In order to achieve
that, our application utilized the PackageManager
class and received data via its getPackageInfo pub-
lic method. This was an instant procedure on con-
temporary devices.245
After permission data were stored locally on the
device, the user was able to participate to the sur-
vey. Initially we gathered basic demographic data,
as figure 1b demonstrates. Then the participants
had to answer six multiple choice questions (by250
clicking on radio buttons). Each question was pre-
sented on a single activity and the user had to
click the ‘Next’ button to proceed with the next
question. It should be noted that all questions had
predefined answers in order to make analysis easier255
for us and distinguish participants who were just
skipping questions by clicking the ‘Next’ button.
When the six questions were answered, the par-
ticipants sent the responses (along with the demo-
graphic and the permissions data) to our server by260
clicking a button. Respondents were able to with-
draw and uninstall the app any time, before they
send their data to the server. At the final step of
the first phase, the application showed to the par-
ticipant a short tutorial that discussed the changes265
at the permission model (figure 1c). Our applica-
tion’s users were told that they could uninstall it
at that phase. However, we suggested them to keep
the application on their devices, because they would
have the chance to participate to the survey again270
in the near future.
The questionnaire should be short and simple,
because according to [13], these types of question-
naires usually attract higher response rates than
long and complex ones. Also, we needed the com-275
pletion of the survey to be an effortless and pleasant
process, given that our participants would volunteer
to provide responses. We chose closed format ques-
tions because they are easy to fill in. Moreover, it
would be easier for users to click on radio buttons280
instead of typing answers to open questions on their
phones. The questions had predefined answers to
assist us clean up the data from responses coming
from users that where just clicking the “Next” but-
ton without reading the questions. However, we285
did not include verifier questions because the ques-
tionnaire was short and we did not want to con-
fuse or disorient the user by asking again the same
question. We ensured that questions were easily
readable on the majority of devices using facilities290
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provided by the Android Studio (an integrated de-
velopment environment for Android developers).
When designing the questionnaire, we followed
the conventional wisdom which contains advice
about how to optimize question order [14]. We or-295
dered the questions according to the following logic:
Early questions should be easy and pleasant to an-
swer [15], and questions on the same topic should
proceed from general to specific [14, 16]. Hence,
participants were first asked how long they were us-300
ing the current OS version and then if they had no-
ticed the permission model change. Then we asked
the respondents if they believed that the afore-
mentioned change affected positively their ability
to manage shared data. With the following two305
questions (number 4 and 5) we intended to see the
users’ familiarity with the new model and if popup
messages, appearing during run-time, were caus-
ing fatigue [17]. Finally, with the last question we
intended to validate that users prefer fine-grained310
permission models as proposed in [18]. The ques-
tions are as follows:
1. How long have you been using the current ver-
sion of the Android operating system? (An-
droid Marshmallow or version 6.0+)315
Offered answers: a) 0 - 6 months, b) 7 - 12
months, c) More that 1 year, d) Don’t Know.
2. Have you noticed any changes at the current
app permission model, compared to the previ-
ous versions of the operating system? (For ex-320
ample, have you ever seen any messages from
any app that asks to give it your permission
in order to access specific resources, e.g. the
Camera?)
Offered answers: a) Yes, b) No, c) Don’t325
Know.
3. Do you think that now you have more control
as a user on the personal data you share? (E.g.
Contact list, SMS, etc.)
Offered answers: a) Yes, b) No, c) Don’t330
Know.
4. Please state if the following quote is Correct
or Wrong, or choose “Don’t Know” if you are
not sure. “I can revoke or grant any app per-
missions anytime from the Settings app of my335
device.”
Offered answers: a) Correct, b) Wrong, c)
Don’t Know.
5. Please state if you Agree or Disagree with the
following quote. “I believe that the new run-340
time permission model is irritating because it
asks me too many questions during running
time (such as: Allow APP to take pictures and
record video?).”
Offered answers: a) I Agree, b) I Disagree.345
6. If you have used older versions of the Android
operating system (e.g. if this is not your first
Android device) you have probably noticed
that now some apps request your permission to
perform some actions, e.g. to access your SMS.350
Previously you just downloaded the apps and
no more requests were made from the device
during runtime. Do you prefer the new per-
mission model (runtime permission requests)
or the old model?355
Offered answers: a) I prefer the new runtime
permission model, b) I prefer the old model, c)
I don’t have any specific preference.
For the second phase of data collection, the ap-
plication generated a notification message after a360
period of one month. Participants who did not
uninstall the application after the completion of the
first phase, received a notification on their devices
(and wearables) to participate again to the survey
(as seen at figure 1d). Hence, there was a chance365
for participants to upload permission data again,
following the same procedure they used at the first
phase of data collection, i.e. by clicking a button.
Therefore, we could use the second set of data to
compare them with the first set. After the second370
set of data was delivered to our server, the users
were gracefully adviced to uninstall the application.
Interestingly, taking into account data provided by
the Google Play Console5 (and considering also a
few pilot trials we ran on various devices prior the375
release of our application), 15 devices (out of 61
that downloaded our application) appeared to have
our application installed four months after we re-
leased it for the first time to the Google Play store.
This means that approximately 24.6% of the users380
did not uninstall the application, despite the fact
that they were prompted to do so.
2.2. Permission Data Acquisition
This section presents our methodology to acquire
permission data from devices. Our intention was to385
correlate the data in order to provide permission
information in a similar fashion with the original
system. For example, figure 1e shows permission
5https://play.google.com/apps/publish/
5
information for the application ‘Messenger’. Infor-
mation for granted permissions for each application390
on Android devices can be obtained using the Set-
tings application as follows: Settings → Apps →
(application) → Permissions. Using the Settings
application, users can grant, deny or revoke permis-
sions to the following groups; Calendar, Camera,395
Contacts, Location, Microphone, Phone, Sensors,
SMS, Storage.
Using the flag GET PERMISSIONS when
calling the getPackageInfo method of the
PackageManager, we can get information400
about the status of each permission for ev-
ery application (requestedPermissions and
requestedPermissionsFlags). Note that “Per-
missions Snapshots” did not gather information
about system’s applications. After experimenting405
with these settings during a pilot study conducted
prior to the official release of the application, we
concluded that for each requested permission,
the system returns public arrays of Strings and
ints denoting the current permission settings on410
the device. In our log files we denoted a granted
permission with 3 and a denied permission with 1.
According to the Android Developers’ documen-
tation6, the first time an application requests to ac-
cess sensitive resources (such as the SMS list on the415
device, using for example the permission READ SMS),
it displays to the users a dialogue message in order
to get explicitly their permission to do so. How-
ever, if users allowed at the past access to a sen-
sitive group (e.g. accepted READ SMS from the SMS420
group), then when the application requests a differ-
ent permission from this group (e.g. SEND SMS), the
system will immediately grant it.
For our analysis we considered these character-
istics to reconstruct the permission settings for425
each application (and each permission group). For
example, if for the package org.telegram.messenger
(the ‘Telegram’ application) the PackageManager
returned “android.permission.READ CONTACTS, 1”
and430
“android.permission.WRITE CONTACTS, 3”, this
means that the application was granted permission
to access the ‘Contacts’ group. Thus, after a user
had chosen to see the permission settings of this
application from the Settings app on the device,435
she would see that the Contacts switch would be
turned to the ‘On’ position (as figure 1e shows).
6http://bit.ly/2d4AdGH
We treat different versions of the same application
uniformly, because we did not expect to see massive
changes among various versions, given that data440
collection was done in a short period of time.
3. Results
The study was publicized at university mailing
lists, social media and forums for a short period of
time (June - August 2016). We stopped collect-445
ing data after the end of August 2016 and we fi-
nally received responses from 52 participants. It
should be noted that no compensation or prizes
were offered at this campaign. Our respondents
contributed to this study as volunteers. In addi-450
tion, during the specific period, the Android De-
velopers Dashboards7 reported that only 10% of
the Android users that visited Google Play had in-
stalled the Marshmallow version on their devices.
Therefore, finding volunteers for this study was ex-455
tremely difficult at the given period. Having that
in mind we followed a lightweight approach in data
collection and decided to apply the snapshots model
instead of constantly monitoring users’ devices. We
believe that this approach would not discourage460
participants to provide anonymous data. In addi-
tion, we expected that our study would probably
attract more tech-savvy users, given that new An-
droid versions’ adoption is usually slow and Nexus
phone users are getting software updates faster than465
others.
Three users from our sample provided the prede-
fined answers of the questionnaire, hence their de-
mographic data and responses were excluded from
the presented results. However, their device data470
were included in the analysis, because they could
not be manipulated or falsified from these users;
these are device-dependent data. Also, two partic-
ipants stated that they were below 18 years old;
therefore, we excluded their data and their re-475
sponses from our dataset and did not take them
into account in the analysis. The minimum age for
an Android user to participate to our study was
set to be the age of 18. Additionally, a particular
file contained permission data, but no demograph-480
ics or responses. However, these permission data
were included in the analysis. Finally, one file (de-
rived from device No 24) contained only permission
data of our application and the responses to the
7http://bit.ly/1kjKifB
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six questions. We included these responses to the485
demographic data too.
3.1. Demographics and Questionnaire
In total, 46 responses to the six questions were
included to the analysis. 85% of the participants
were male and 15% were female. More than half of490
the users were between 18 to 30 years of age (52%),
37% were 31 to 46 years old, 9% were between 47
and 65 years old and 2% were above 66 years old.
The majority of the respondents were residents of
Europe (74%); the rest were from America-Canada495
(17%) and 9% of the respondents claimed they were
from Asia.
Regarding the responses at the first question,
52% of the participants had been using the An-
droid Marshmallow version for 0 - 6 months. 30%500
of the participants had been using the OS for 7 - 12
months and 11% claimed they had been using the
system for more than a year. The latter response
may seem inaccurate because Marshmallow was re-
leased during the last quarter of 2015. However,505
this finding might indicate that a few respondents
were mobile software developers who were using the
Developer Previews of the system; these were re-
leased earlier, during summer 2015. This expla-
nation is reasonable if we take into consideration510
that the application was also advertized to Google+
Communities related to Android. The rest of the
participants (7%) clicked the “I Don’t Know” op-
tion.
Considering the second question, 89% of the par-515
ticipants replied that they had noticed the change
at the permission model. 7% said they did not
notice any difference and 4% chose the “I Don’t
Know” answer. This finding shows that the major-
ity of the participants were familiar with the change520
at the permission model.
The consequent questions were related to the se-
curity and usability of the new permission model.
At the third question, 65% of the respondents
replied positively; they thought that the users could525
effectively control the personal data they share un-
der the run-time permission model. 17% replied
negatively and 17% said “I Don’t Know”. The re-
sponses at question 4 demonstrated that the partic-
ipants of our study were familiar with the new ca-530
pabilities the Settings app provide. 78% chose the
“I Agree” response, 7% clicked on “I Disagree” and
15% said “I Don’t Know”. Considering the usabil-
ity of the model and the security fatigue that might
cause, the responses at the fifth question showed535
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Figure 2: Boxplots Showing Distribution of the Number of
Installed Applications, Declared Permissions and Dangerous
Permissions per Device.
that Marshmallow users were not overwhelmed by
security dialogue messages produced by the system.
89% of the participants replied “I Disagree” and
only 11% clicked on the “I Agree” choice.
At the final question the participants were asked540
if they prefer the run-time permission model or the
old one. 78% of them stated they prefer the run-
time permission model and 9% said they prefer the
previous model. Additionally, 13% clicked the “I
don’t have any specific preference” option. The an-545
swers to the last question indicate that users re-
acted positively to the changes, confirming previous
results [18].
To conclude this section, the answers of the ma-
jority of users in our sample suggest that they550
think they can control the data they share more
efficiently under the run-time permissions model.
Also the participants in our study were not frus-
trated by the dialogue messages the system issues
and, finally, they preferred the run-time permis-555
sions model, compared to the previous one.
3.2. Data Analysis
As discussed previously, we received permission
data from 52 devices but we finally analyzed data
derived from 49 devices. Recall that one device560
returned permission data only from our application
and 2 participants declared they were younger than
18 years old; thus, these permission data were ex-
cluded from analysis. The following information is
provided to describe our dataset in details.565
3.2.1. Installed Applications
The average number of installed applications per
device was approximately 71 and the standard devi-
ation was 52.69. The maximum number of applica-
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Table 1: Most Popular Applications in the Dataset.
Applications - Packages Installations %
com.facebook.orca 37 75.5
com.whatsapp 32 65.3
com.twitter.android 31 63.3
com.google.android.apps.translate 23 46.9
com.facebook.katana 22 44.9
com.spotify.music 22 44.9
com.skype.raider 20 40.8
com.ubercab 20 40.8
tions found on a single device was 283 and the min-570
imum was 19. The number of unique applications
that were seen in the collected dataset was 1,983 ap-
plications. Figure 2 shows the number of installed
applications per device (first boxplot). The most
popular applications among the participants of our575
study can be seen at Table 1.
3.2.2. Declared and Dangerous Permissions
Android applications contain declared permis-
sions in the AndroidManifest.xml file. This in-
formation is available to the PackageManager dur-580
ing run-time. Using the methodology described
in Section 2.2 we gathered the declared permis-
sions for each application in our dataset. The
average number of permissions declared in the
AndroidManifest.xml file of each application was585
approximately 12.39 (with standard deviation =
10.94). The average number of dangerous permis-
sions per application was approximately 3.85 (with
standard deviation = 3.21). Distributions of these
data are provided in figure 2.590
The aforementioned numbers indicate that (on
average) 31% of the declared permissions in
the AndroidManifest.xml file of each applica-
tion belonged to dangerous permissions groups.
The application com.baidu.appsearch declared 118595
permissions in its manifest file and 19 of
them belonged to dangerous groups. More-
over, the application ‘Signal Private Messenger’
(org.thoughtcrime.securesms) declared 20 permis-
sions that belonged to dangerous permissions600
groups. These applications presented the highest
number of declared and dangerous permissions in
our dataset, respectively. Table 2 shows applica-
tions that declared the highest number of permis-
sions and Table 3 those with the highest number605
of dangerous permissions in our dataset. Note that
some applications can be seen more than once, hav-
ing different number of declared or dangerous per-
Table 2: Applications that Declared Highest Number of Per-
missions.
Applications Permissions
Packages Declared Dangerous
com.baidu.appsearch 118 19
com.qihoo.appstore 94 19
com.sec.android.easyMover 84 12
com.sec.android.easyMover 82 12
com.wandoujia.phoenix2 80 9
com.kingroot.kinguser 80 4
com.lenovo.magicplus 79 18
com.boying.store 75 12
Table 3: Applications that Declared Highest Number of Dan-
gerous Permissions.
Applications Permissions
Packages Declared Dangerous
org.thoughtcrime.securesms 57 20
net.dinglisch.android.taskerm 51 19
com.baidu.appsearch 118 19
com.qihoo.appstore 94 19
com.kms.free 49 18
com.lenovo.magicplus 79 18
com.lenovo.leos.cloud.sync 53 18
com.sec.chaton 58 17
missions, because the dataset contained different
versions of them.610
3.3. Permission Groups
We mentioned previously (in Section 2.2) that
we grouped the declared permissions to simulate
the user interface of the Settings app when it shows
the granted permissions per application (Figure 1e).615
According to the Android Developers documenta-
tion8, there exist 9 groups of dangerous permissions
at API level 23 and above (up to API 27 as of Jan-
uary 2018): Calendar, Camera, Contacts, Location,
Microphone, Phone, Sensors, SMS, Storage.620
3.3.1. Dangerous Permissions Requests per Device
First, we estimated how many applications on
average request access to dangerous permissions
groups per device. Hence, we measured the appear-
ance of dangerous permissions in the manifest file of625
each application per device. In this step we did not
consider if the particular groups were granted access
permission by the user. We demonstrate the results
8http://bit.ly/2d4AdGH
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Figure 3: Dangerous Permissions Groups Requests per De-
vice.
Table 4: Average Use of Dangerous Permission Groups.
Permission Groups Average Use (%) S.D.
Calendar 7.34 5.16
Camera 30.46 9.36
Contacts 58.02 12.78
Location 49.67 12.20
Microphone 21.63 9.37
Phone 40.56 10.56
Sensors 0.93 1.19
SMS 16.51 9.23
Storage 76.64 7.18
at Figure 3, which presents the average danger-
ous permissions requests per device (concatenated630
as dangerous permissions groups). Figure 3 shows
that the Camera, Contacts, Location, Phone and
Storage groups were the most requested dangerous
groups per device.
In addition, Table 4 presents more generic infor-635
mation, showcasing the average use of dangerous
permissions (gathered as groups) and their stan-
dard deviations in our dataset. We can see that
indeed requests to access the device’s storage were
made by almost 77% of the applications in our640
dataset. Other popular resources for applications
were the Contact list and the Location; access to
these resources were requested by the half of the
applications in our dataset.
3.3.2. Permission Groups’ Accessibility645
Figure 4 provides a rough representation of the
permission groups’ accessibility. This figure demon-
strates the percentage of permission groups that
appeared to be accessible from the installed appli-
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Figure 4: Dangerous Permission Groups Accessibility (%)
per Device.
cations per device. The methodology described at650
Section 2.2 was used to estimate these percentages.
As figure 4 shows, users tend to have a stable be-
havior (considering their security preferences) when
dealing with different applications on the same de-
vice. For example, more than 80% of the appli-655
cations on device No 34 could access the distinct
permission groups.
However, this indication (that users seem to have
a stable behavior when granting access to resources
on their devices to various applications) might be660
skewed by the fact that there existed numerous ap-
plications per device that were probably not de-
signed to adhere to the new permission model.
Thus, during the transitional period our experi-
ments took place, applications like ‘Snapchat’ ap-665
peared to have access to all dangerous resources,
in order to maintain backward compatibility. Such
applications can be easily identified if the user tries
to revoke access to resources via the Settings app;
the system will issue the following message, which670
is rather preventive in our opinion: “This app was
designed for an older version of Android. Denying
permission may cause it to no longer function as
intended”.
Despite that figure 4 provides probably a noisy675
representation of the accessibility to sensitive re-
sources, it forms an early estimation that users tend
to persistently grant access to specific resources and
deny it to others. In the next sections we will study
closely users’ privacy preferences for popular appli-680
cations.
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Table 5: Installations of Social Media Applications in our
Sample.
Applications - Packages Installations appr. %
com.facebook.orca 37 76
com.whatsapp 32 65
com.twitter.android 31 63
com.facebook.katana 22 45
com.skype.raider 20 41
com.instagram.android 14 29
com.linkedin.android 13 27
org.telegram.messenger 7 14
3.4. Fine-grained Permissions on Social Media and
Communication Applications
This Section presents users’ security preferences,
considering fine-grained permission settings for685
popular social media applications. We focused
on social media and messaging applications be-
cause they were installed by numerous participants.
Other application categories (such as business or
travel) are not studied here because we did not have690
adequate data from enough users that would allow
us to make safe conclusions.
3.4.1. Users with Fine-Grained Permission Set-
tings
Table 1 showed the most popular applications in695
the dataset. Note that most of them are social me-
dia and messaging applications. Thus, we focused
our study on eight applications and instant mes-
sengers: (Facebook) Messenger (orca), Facebook
(katana), Whatsapp, Twitter, Skype, Instagram,700
Linkedin and Telegram. We will refer to this set of
applications as the ‘social’ set S. Despite Telegram
was not among the most installed applications, it
was added in this section because it is known for
its ‘end-to-end’ encryption capabilities. Hence, it705
would be interesting to see users’ preferences for
this application. Table 5 shows the popularity of
the aforementioned applications in our sample (per-
centage of installations). Facebook Messenger ap-
peared to be more popular than the Facebook ap-710
plication itself, indicating that there exists a con-
siderable number of users that prefer to use only
the Messenger application.
Table 6 shows the percentage of devices on which
applications from S were allowed (All On) or “de-715
nied” (All Off) access to all permission groups, or
appeared to have fine-grained settings, respectively
(F-Gr). We should note here that in the “denied”
category we also included permissions that were
Table 6: Percentage of Devices with Fine-tuned Permission
Settings for Applications in the S set.
Applications All On (%) All Off (%) F-Gr (%)
Messenger 24 22 54
WhatsApp 44 0 56
Twitter 23 19 58
Facebook 23 9 68
Skype 35 15 50
Instagram 7 29 64
LinkedIn 38 15 46
Telegram 0 14 86
never invoked by the apps. According to this ta-720
ble, on average, approximately 60% of devices did
not allow access to at least one sensitive resource.
However, given that we did not store applications’
usage statistics, we cannot assume that access to
this resource was requested and eventually was de-725
nied by the user. Note that the last row on table 6
shows that no participant granted all permissions to
the Telegram application. This finding makes sense
considering that Telegram’s target group is privacy
aware users, which are probably more selective or730
cautious when dealing with permission settings.
3.4.2. Analysis Based on the F-Gr User Group
To avoid misleading conclusions arising from the
possibility that participants might not have used
a specific application from the social set S, we735
only considered (in this and the following section)
participants with fine-grained permission settings.
Indeed, this assumption might exclude permission
data from users who denied access to all resources
when they ran the specific applications or they did740
not ever use the app. However, we believe that the
F-Gr user group will give us a better understand-
ing on how users, who care about permissions, act.
Figure 5 (a, b, c) shows graphically how our partic-
ipants tuned their permission settings for the Face-745
book Messenger, WhatsApp and Uber applications
respectively. Green color indicates that permission
was granted to the dangerous group and red color
indicates that permission was denied or revoked by
the user to the dangerous group. Ochre cells in-750
dicate that permissions for the specific group were
not found on the device. For example, user No 3
had probably installed an older version of the Uber
application, which did not include the use of the
device’s microphone (figure 5c). Results are not755
affected by the fact that we do not differentiate
between older versions of the same application be-
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Figure 5: Permission Settings of Users in the F-Gr Group for Various Applications. Green Color Indicates the Resource was
Accessible, Red Color Indicates the Opposite. Ochre Color Shows that the Group was not Declared on this Device.
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cause these versions were eventually excluded from
the F-Gr group (with 2 exceptions, shown in Fig-
ures 5c, 5f).760
Figure 5 indicates that there exist similarities at
users’ settings if we observe each subfigure verti-
cally. For example, the majority of Facebook Mes-
senger’s users did not provide access to Phone, SMS
and Location (94.74%, 89.48% and 73.69%, respec-765
tively). On the other hand, Storage, Microphone
and Camera were granted access by a large num-
ber of participants (84.21%, 84.21% and 73.69%,
respectively).
Similarly, Figures 5d and 5e demonstrate users’770
settings for Facebook and Twitter. Figure 5d show-
cases that Facebook users did not allow access
to Calendar, SMS, Microphone or Phone (93.33%,
93.33%, 80% and 80%, respectively). On the con-
trary, Facebook had access to the Storage and Lo-775
cation groups in 93.33% and 60% of the devices,
respectively. Analogous numbers can be identified
among Twitter users. Storage and Location were
accessible in 73.33% and 80% of the devices, but
in general users seem to be more rigorous regarding780
giving access to other dangerous permission groups.
Note that we do not suggest here that the same user
grants or denies the same permissions on Facebook
and Twitter.
WhatsApp users in our sample did not allow ac-785
cess to Location and Phone groups (77.78% and
94.44%) but they were more keen to allow access
to the SMS group, compared to Messenger users
(66.67% and 10.52%). All Uber users allowed ac-
cess to the Location group (100%) and the majority790
of applications (except Uber) present high accessi-
bility of the Storage group (84.21%, 100%, 38.89%,
93.33%, 73.33%, 90% respectively). This is an in-
dication that most applications require access to
the device’s storage in order to provide their basic795
functionality; hence, users allow them to access this
group. Given that users are keener to permit this
request entails security risks, because malicious ap-
plications may request access to the Storage group
in the right context and then misuse it.800
Users’ preferences may be also linked with their
level of trust to the specific application or they may
only indicate how users interact with these appli-
cations. For example, the fact that the Camera
group is in general marked red in both applications805
might denote that the majority of our participants
did not primarily use Facebook or Twitter to take
pictures. Thus, the demonstrated accessibility in
Figure 5 could possibly be linked with the level of
functionality of each application and also with the810
level of trust the users show to them. Further re-
search work should be done to investigate this ques-
tion. However, visual schemes like those presented
in Figure 5 can be read both vertically and horizon-
tally and provide insights about the use of applica-815
tions under the run-time model. A vertical view
demonstrates how the majority of users tuned their
permission settings for each application. A horizon-
tal view shows individual users’ preferences. For
example, user No 17 seems to have similar behav-820
ior when using Messenger and WhatsApp because
Phone, Location and SMS groups are marked with
red color in both cases. Common permission set-
tings across a number of different applications from
the same category can eventually create users’ pri-825
vacy profiles.
3.4.3. A Generic Comparison for Granted Permis-
sions per Application
Figure 6 presents in a concise graph the percent-
age of users that granted permissions to danger-830
ous groups per application. As previously stated,
we only consider participants from the F-Gr group,
as seen at Table 6. Figure 6 shows for example
that all users allowed the LinkedIn application to
access their Contact List (100%). However, appli-835
cations like Messenger and Facebook demonstrate
lower rates of accessibility to this permission group
(47% and 33%, respectively). Also, users of messag-
ing applications like Messenger, WhatsApp, Skype
and Telegram seem to be more keen to grant ac-840
cess to the Microphone permission group. At the
same time, Facebook, Twitter, Uber and Instagram
present high numbers of accessibility to Location
services.
We can also extract additional common charac-845
teristics from figure 6 regarding users’ preferences
and permission settings. For instance, if we focus on
the Storage group we can see that most of the users
allow the applications (of our social set S) to access
the storage of their devices. However, users’ prefer-850
ences indicate that they are more reluctant to grant
storage access to applications like Uber. This find-
ing is probably linked with the functionality of each
application and the reasons we use them. Another
generic observation can be made for the SMS group.855
We derive that users are hesitant to allow applica-
tions to access their SMS list with the exception of
WhatsApp and Telegram. A possible explanation
for this result is that both applications provide end-
to-end encryption, providing higher levels of trust860
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Figure 6: Percentage of Granted Permissions per Application
(from S set) Considering F-Gr Group Participants.
to their users. In general, these two applications
present high levels of accessibility (70% and above)
in almost all dangerous groups. Furthermore, one
could note that WhatsApp and Telegram’s Loca-
tion accessibility is not high (approximately 20%).865
The gathered data are not sufficient to allow us to
explain why this occurred. However, the answer to
this phenomenon might be hidden in the interplay
of trust and functionality. Trust in this context is
not only linked with the use of encryption; trust870
can be also derived from the developer of the app.
3.5. Users’ Behavioral Consistency
In this section we study if users present a con-
sistent behavior when they are using different ap-
plications on their devices. In other words, we ex-875
amine if the same participant follows the same be-
havioral patterns when using the fine-grained per-
mission system on a variety of applications on the
same device. In order to do that, we identified the
users in our sample who had installed at least 3 of880
the applications listed at Table 5 on their devices.
Note that LinkedIn and Telegram applications were
excluded from the analysis for this section, because
the former application declares access to only 3 dan-
gerous groups and the latter was installed only on885
7 devices. Thus, we are particularly interested in
permission-aggressive applications in this context.
We will refer to this set of applications as the ‘pop-
ular’ set P. As the goal of this section is to highlight
consistent behaviors regarding permission settings890
preferences, we did not take into consideration the
Calendar permissions group, because it is declared
only on Facebook. Hence, we evaluate similarities
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Figure 7: Users’ Behavioral Consistency Considering Appli-
cations from the P Set.
to the way users grant or deny access to specific re-
sources considering at least 3 popular social media895
applications installed on the same device.
3.5.1. Behavioral Similarity
We define the term ‘behavioral similarity’ to as-
sess common characteristics of user’s behavior re-
lated to the permission settings on their devices.900
Behavioral similarity or behavioral consistency is
defined here as the quality of preserving similar user
behavior when various applications (at least 3) re-
quest access to a specific permission group. For
example, if the user has granted (or denied) access905
to the Microphone group to at least 60% of social
media applications (installed on the same device),
then this is considered in this work to indicate be-
havioral consistency.
Figure 7 demonstrates the behavioral consistency910
of 33 users in our sample. Here we did not exclude
users from the ‘All On’ and ‘All Off’ groups, in or-
der to provide a more generic view. The inclusion of
these users will probably result in very high values
of consistency in rare occasions where all considered915
applications belong to the ‘All On’ group. Given
that we did not store information that would reveal
if installed applications were compiled to abide the
new model, we included these users in the analysis.
In general, users had installed at least 3 applications920
from the popular applications set, as discussed pre-
viously. The goal of our analysis here is to evaluate
if a user who denies (or grants) access to a specific
dangerous group for one application, maintains the
same behavior, when asked to provide access to the925
particular dangerous group by another application.
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Figure 9: Average Behavioral Consistency of Users (33 Par-
ticipants).
The calculation of a user’s behavioral consistency
was performed as follows. Considering the num-
ber of applications (from the popular set P) found
on a single device, we highlighted which of them930
were granted or denied access to each permission
group. For example, user No 5 had installed 5 ap-
plications from the popular set. Access to Camera,
Contacts and Microphone was denied to 4 applica-
tions among them (80%). On the contrary, access935
to Storage was granted to 4 applications (80%) and
access to Location was granted to 3 applications
(60%), as figure 7 shows. We consider as consistent
behaviour either the persistent denial or the persis-
tent permittance to a specific resource. Another ex-940
ample is User No 3, who only presented similarities
at the Contacts, Location and Storage groups set-
tings (83.3%, 66.67%, 66.67%, respectively). Again,
given the lack of usage statistics, we cannot decide
if a group was asked to be given access; these per-945
missions are included in the “denied” category.
Figure 8 complements figure 7 and shows the per-
sistence per user in denying or allowing access to
resources when prompted by applications of set P.
Ochre cells indicate that the user did not present950
consistent behavior for the specific dangerous group
or the applications did not request access to these
resources. Figure 8 can be utilized to extract user
profiles according to their privacy and security set-
tings. For example, users such as No 13, 34, 35955
seem to have similar behaviors when granting ac-
cess to social media applications. As future work,
we aim to identify such privacy profiles.
Finally, we estimated the average values of be-
havioral consistency per user and the results can960
be seen at Figure 9. The overall average behav-
ior consistency in our sample is 83.26% and the
standard deviation is 10.05. Without a doubt,
behavioural consistency seems to be high in our
dataset. This probably occurs because the set P965
consists of a small number of popular applications,
basically from the social media and messaging cate-
gory. Thus, the elements of similarity in functional-
ity and trustfulness are present in this set. Further
work should be done in the future to examine if970
behavioral consistency is maintained when we com-
pare applications from different categories and if
these high numbers of consistency remain the same
when we are dealing with larger groups of users.
To conclude, this section presented our analysis975
on 33 participants, which indicates that users of
popular social media in our sample demonstrated
consistency, allowing or denying access in a uni-
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form fashion to resources which are protected with
dangerous permissions.980
3.5.2. Behavioral Consistency over Time
The second phase of experiments aimed to an-
alyze if participants’ preferences and permissions
settings change after a period of time. The ap-
plication we developed set an alarm to the device,985
which would go off one month after the applica-
tion was first launched. In addition, we used the
Google Cloud Messaging service to further enhance
communication with the devices that still had our
application installed (via push notifications).990
As mentioned at Section 2.1, we indicated the
changes of the permission model to the users by
showing a small tutorial at the last part of the first
phase. Participants were reminded that they could
revoke access to sensitive resources using the Set-995
tings application. We suggested the participants to
keep the application on their devices after the first
phase was completed and participate again, when
they see a notification on their phones (or on their
Android smartwatches). The notifications were not1000
persistent; they were designed to be erased (clicking
the ‘Clear All’ option on the Notification drawer)
if the user did not want to participate for a second
time to our experiments. As already noted, our par-
ticipants were volunteers and we did not want the1005
application to be very pervasive and aggressive.
The participants sent their data during the sec-
ond phase on a voluntary basis; just like the first
phase, no compensation was provided. During the
second phase, 24.49% of the participants (12 out of1010
49 participants that constituted the ‘first phase’ set
of users) send us their permission data. Note that
numerous participants uninstalled our application
after the first phase, thus we did not get responses
from them. We gathered our findings regarding the1015
alterations of permission settings during the second
phase at Table 7.
Table 7 shows that the respondents during the
second phase installed additional applications on
their devices. The average number of installed ap-1020
plications is approximately 80 per device. It was 74
at the first phase (rounded in both cases), if we take
into account only these 12 devices. This is indeed
a rough estimation, but it shows that participants
installed additional applications on their phones in1025
the one-month period between the two phases of
our experiments. Hence, they were actually using
their devices in this period.
The last row of Table 7 shows the percentage
of installed applications having at least one altered1030
permission setting, compared to the first phase set-
tings. On average, we derive that (per device) only
2.26% of the installed applications presented altered
permission settings. As a matter of fact, 50% of the
respondents’ devices did not present any changes at1035
their permission settings. We must stress again that
at the end of the first phase, all participants saw a
tutorial underlining that Marshmallow users were
able to change any permission, for any application,
anytime they wanted using the Settings application.1040
In total, 14 applications were found having al-
tered permission settings in our dataset. Among
them, user No 5 revoked access to the Contacts
group for 1 application and user No 46 revoked ac-
cess to the Camera for 1 application (presented in1045
bold at Table 8). On the contrary, 14 applications
presented altered permission settings providing ac-
cess to the following dangerous groups: 5 appli-
cations were given access to the Storage group, 3
applications were allowed to access the Microphone1050
and the Camera groups and 2 applications were able
to access the Location and the Contacts groups.
Details can be seen at Table 8. Table 8 indicates
that users at the second phase of our experiments
were again more keen to allow access to the Stor-1055
age group. Additionally, note that only users No 5
and No 46 changed permissions to social media and
communication applications from set P.
It would be ideal to repeat the experiments more
than once in order to make conclusions that are1060
more robust; hence, we could obtain more than one
additional snapshot. A longitudinal study in this
context would provide insightful details of users’ ac-
tions. However, we believe that this strategy would
discourage our volunteers to participate and they1065
would be disengaged from the beginning of the ex-
periments. Thus, we chose to proceed with the less
pervasive approach of taking one additional permis-
sion snapshot from the participants’ devices. Also,
it would be interesting to have the ability to in-1070
terview participants who returned a second set of
permission data in order to better understand why
users adjusted their apps’ privacy settings a month
later or why they did not do that. However, re-
ceived data were anonymous, hence we do not have1075
this opportunity. We recognize that this is a limita-
tion of our pilot study but future work will account
for that.
As a conclusion, results presented in this section
demonstrated that users’ initial permission settings1080
16
did not radically change in the second snapshot.
Half of the users from the second snapshot did not
change any permission settings for the installed ap-
plications. The other users just changed a small
part of the initial settings. Also, the results show1085
that our participants are more willing to provide ac-
cess to their devices’ storage, when an application
initiates such a request.
3.6. ChatON Tokens
While analyzing collected permission data we1090
made an interesting observation. Permission
data derived from devices having installed the
’ChatON’ application – i.e. devices No 2
and No 40 – included the following permission:
com.sec.spp.permission.TOKEN . This was fol-1095
lowed by a unique token (a 256 character hexadec-
imal number). We downloaded the application on
a rooted Nexus 7 (2012) tablet that was running
a custom ROM (Marshmallow version) and experi-
mented with it. We used this device to send permis-1100
sion data and we marked the (token) number that
was attached in the com.sec.spp.permission.TOKEN
permission for the given device. Then the device
was restarted and the ChatON application was re-
launched. The token was the same, which means1105
that this number is persistent. Despite that the
ChatON service is no longer available9, this to-
ken can be used by third party applications (just
like ‘Permissions Snapshot’ did) to identify a de-
vice, just by using the public PackageManager class.1110
This forms an example of bad coding practice which
should be avoided, because it introduces vulnerabil-
ities related to privacy; these tokens might be used
for the identification of a device.
4. Discussion1115
Android mobile OS introduced a significant en-
hancement to its access control system with the
advent of the Marshmallow version. Previous
work [18] showed that users would prevent permis-
sion requests from applications if they had this abil-1120
ity. The former generation of the Android OS did
not provide this opportunity to the users. There-
fore, all permission requests from an application
were accepted by default, if users agreed to install
it on their devices. Our work, validates the results1125
9http://bit.ly/MMG2pP
of [18] using data derived from actual devices run-
ning Android 6.0+. In addition, the results we pre-
sented in this paper (regarding permission groups’
accessibility rates) were confirmed by another re-
search work, which gathered data from a different1130
group of participants [19].
The current study shows that it is possible
to gain information about users’ permission set-
tings utilizing publicly accessible classes such as
the PackageManager class. This methodology al-1135
lows third-party applications to acquire information
about how individuals tune their privacy settings
in their personal digital ecosystems. Additional
data (such as firstInstallTime, lastUpdateTime,
targetSdkVersion) can be acquired using the1140
PackageManager to enrich our knowledge about in-
stalled applications. Collected information can be
assembled to depict users’ privacy profiles, as Fig-
ures 5 and 9 demonstrated. Therefore, this work
demonstrated that under the run-time permission1145
model it is possible to create anonymous user pro-
files. These profiles could be used by online ven-
dors to further personalize their digital application
stores. In addition, personal privacy profiles can be
used by artificial intelligence agents, which are em-1150
bedded in the most modern mobile operating sys-
tems, in order to optimize recommendations to in-
dividual users.
The results of our pilot study initiate a discussion
about how effective the new model is in providing1155
additional security to the user. We have seen that
most applications request access to device’s stor-
age and the majority of users allow them to ac-
cess it. However, we have noticed that, on average,
60% of the participants used fine-grained settings1160
on their devices, which is a positive step towards
security and privacy enhancement. On the other
hand, data derived from a small set of 12 partici-
pants who submitted permission data for a second
time, showed that only one permission was revoked1165
on participants’ No 5 and No 46 devices, respec-
tively. This finding complements and validates re-
cent work which examines the lack of continuance
of secure behavior from users [20].
4.1. Limitations1170
Although we attracted a considerable number of
participants for this pilot study, we did not make
extensive use of all collected data. This happened
because we did not get detailed information about
how often an application is used on the specific de-1175
vice, or if it was actually launched at least once be-
17
fore data collection occured. Therefore, we included
at the second part of our analysis only participants
who had used fine-grained settings for their appli-
cations, excluding others that might continuously1180
prevent applications to access sensitive resources.
Thus, we could not reliably identify if there exist
users that consistently deny access to specific ap-
plications. However, in future work we will account
for this problem, engaging respondents to provide1185
usage statistics. This will be achieved by recruiting
participants from crowd sourcing platforms, such
as Amazon Mechanical Turk or Microworkers. The
current work can be considered as a pilot study on
real users’ devices that initiates a discussion about1190
how Android users adjusted to the fine-grained ac-
cess control paradigm.
Additionally, although we distributed ‘Permis-
sions Snapshot’ via Google Play, our study was con-
ducted during a period when the majority of An-1195
droid users owned devices that were running older
versions of the OS. Therefore, the participants of
this study were mainly males and probably most of
them were tech savvy individuals, owning Google
Nexus smartphones and tablets. Unsurprisingly,1200
our sample included users having super user priv-
ileges on their devices. However, we also received
data from participants with different profiles (e.g.
older people or users with limited number of in-
stalled applications), hence the behavioral patterns1205
demonstrated in this paper should not be linked
with specific groups of people.
Moreover, we should acknowledge the fact that
when it comes to questions related to privacy en-
hancement, most of the users would probably agree1210
that they prefer more privacy. Thus, the reader
should take into account that users often lean to-
wards utility than privacy [12] and should be careful
when making extrapolations from the results. Fur-
ther work in the future will include a larger and1215
more diverse sample of users, given that the run-
time permission model is currently utilized in 3 An-
droid versions (Marshmallow, Nougat, Oreo). We
also plan to assess users’ privacy and security pro-
files using frameworks like [21].1220
5. Related Work
Previous work highlighted privacy- and security-
related concerns associated with Android’s install-
time application permission system, such as the
proliferation of over-privileged applications [22]. In1225
a recent study, Pearce et al. [23] showed that ap-
proximately 49% of the Android applications at the
Android Market were over-privileged because of the
use of advertising libraries. Moreover, the authors
indicate that such pervasive over-privileging consti-1230
tutes a threat to users’ privacy.
Prior work that studies user-defined privacy and
security controls on mobile devices showed that
users (on average) have to make over a hundred
permission decisions per device [7]. In addition,1235
researchers demonstrated than users are often un-
aware of the number (or the context) of permissions
they granted to applications at the past [24]. Jeon
et al. [25] proposed a framework to address secu-
rity issues that arise from the (old) coarse-grained1240
permission model. They used a taxonomy of four
main Android permissions groups and developed a
fine-grained permission model to increase the secu-
rity of existing apps without affecting functionality
and without requiring platform modifications.1245
A recent paper by Wijesekera et al. [18] showed
that during a study, at least 80% of the participants
indicated that they would prevent at least one per-
mission request of their experimental application
if they were aware of its purpose and functional-1250
ity. The participants also stated that they would
block over a third of permission requests if they had
this choice. However, other studies highlighted that
most of the users do not pay attention to system
messages related to permission requests [26]. Addi-1255
tionally, researchers demonstrated that users were
often surprised by the ability of applications to col-
lect personal data in the background and share data
with third parties [27]. Advertising libraries for ex-
ample have been consistently examined for data ex-1260
posure and leakages; a recent study revealed a trend
in advertising networks to become more aggressive
in collecting reachable user data [28].
In the previous years, a number of security ex-
tension mechanisms have been proposed to over-1265
come privacy constrains of the previous permission
model [29]. Some approaches add access control
processes to provide the user the ability to choose
permissions and reduce run-time constrains for each
application [30]. Other methodologies introduce1270
fine-grained access controls for Android applica-
tions aiming to enforce control over the assignment
of permissions through explicit policies [31]. More-
over, FlaskDroid [29] extended the latter framework
to provide a flexible, fine-grained access control1275
mechanism for diverse security policies. Further-
more, TaintDroid [32] was designed to track tainted
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data from essential sources on Android and detect
unauthorized data leakage.
In order to protect mobile devices from unlim-1280
ited data sharing, several systems have been pro-
posed. Some approaches focus on location ser-
vices [33], offering its users the ability to adjust
location accuracy when using location-based appli-
cations. At the same time, on-device or service-1285
based obfuscation techniques have been advised as
a methodology to maintain users’ privacy [34]. Such
schemes according to [35], that utilize abstract loca-
tion descriptions, may cause location sharing to in-
crease. Beresford et al. [36] presented their system,1290
named MockDroid, which essentially feeds ‘empty’
resources or ‘fake’ information to apps that re-
quire access to sensitive data [25]. Another data
protection mechanism that relies on obfuscation is
AppFence [37]; this system substitutes shadow data1295
in place of data that the user wants to keep private.
In addition, there exist methods based on crowd-
sourcing, which aim to utilize contributors’ protec-
tion decisions in order to provide application spe-
cific privacy recommendations for iOS devices [38].1300
Fine-grained permissions were indeed first intro-
duced earlier on another platform (iOS 6). How-
ever, our current work assesses for the first time se-
curity settings of users based on data derived from
their own devices, which were not modified for the1305
needs of this study. In this work we assume that
participants do not share their devices with other
people and we intent to highlight behavioral pat-
terns related with their perceptions of security. In
this paper we presented preliminary results based1310
on a small set of users. However, we believe that
the approach we used in tandem with an improved
version of the survey app, which collects more con-
textual information (following principles presented
in other research works [3]), is promising and will1315
assist us to identify privacy preferences of Android
users.
6. Conclusions
To conclude, in this paper we discussed the re-
sults of our pilot study that investigates Android1320
users’ security and privacy settings and preferences
under the run-time permission model. The re-
sponses from our participants indicate that these
users maintain a positive view about this change.
Most of them claimed they prefer the new system1325
and they believe that now they can control eas-
ily the sensitive data they share. We also demon-
strated that, in general, one third of the requested
permissions in our sample belonged to dangerous
permission groups. Additionally, we showed that1330
Storage, Contacts, Location, Phone and Camera
were the most requested dangerous permissions
groups from the installed applications in the partici-
pants’ devices. Furthermore, considering the acces-
sibility of particular applications to resources, we1335
highlighted the persistence of users to allow access
to groups that are directly related to their main
functionality (e.g. Camera for Instagram or Con-
tacts for LinkedIn). Moreover, we showed that (in
general) users’ behavior is consistent regarding the1340
resources they allow to social media applications
to access. However, additional research work needs
to be done to assess users’ trust to specific appli-
cations. Finally, after collecting permission data
from the same sample of participants after a pe-1345
riod of one month, we found out that 50% of the
respondents had not changed any permission set-
tings on their devices. This might occured either
because they did not request additional functional-
ity from the apps, or because they did not use the1350
apps during the one month period. Furthermore,
only 2.26% of the installed applications (on aver-
age) presented different permission settings. Hence,
we conclude that although Android (starting from
version 6.0+) provides the ability to its users to con-1355
trol more efficiently resources used by applications,
our participants did not utilize this functionality
widely. In the future we wil address the limitations
of this pilot study by capturing usage data to stress
the context within the users’ decisions are made.1360
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